Charting a Course through Difficult Legislative Waters: Tribunal Decisions on Life-Sustaining Measures by Willmott, Lindy & White, Ben
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Willmott, Lindy & White, Benjamin P. (2005) Charting a course through
difficult legislative waters: tribunal decisions on life-sustaining measures.
Journal of Law and Medicine, 12(4), pp. 441-454.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/10356/
c© Copyright 2005 Thomson Legal and Regulatory
Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher.
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
(2005) 12 JLM 441 441 ©  
This is author version of article published as: 
Willmott, Lindy and White, Benjamin P. (2005) Charting a Course through Difficult 
Legislative Waters: Tribunal Decisions on Life-Sustaining Measures. Journal of Law 
and Medicine 12(4):pp. 441-454. 
Copyright 2005 Thomson Legal & Regulatory 
Charting a course through difficult legislative 
waters: Tribunal decisions on life-sustaining 
measures 
Lindy Willmott∗ and Ben White∗∗ 
Since the enactment in Queensland of the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 and 
the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000, a decision can be made to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment from an adult who 
lacks capacity to make such decisions for him or herself.  The Guardianship 
and Administration Tribunal of Queensland has been asked to consider the 
law in relation to these decisions on a number of occasions since the 
legislation was passed.   This article explores the relevant provisions of 
these statutes and some of the difficulties that arise from how they are 
currently drafted.  It also examines how the Guardianship and 
Administration Tribunal has dealt with applications to withhold or withdraw 
life-sustaining measures, and suggests a course that might avoid some of 
the difficulties that are inherent in Queensland’s legislative regime. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Decisions to withhold or withdraw medical treatment that a person needs in order to continue living 
have nearly always been made without recourse to the courts. Through discussion, negotiation and 
reflection, a person’s family and medical team can usually reach agreement as to whether or not 
treatment should be given. On occasions, however, the issue has found its way into the judicial 
system,1 and in Queensland, the Guardianship and Administration Tribunal (the tribunal) has 
jurisdiction to hear such matters2 in relation to adults with impaired capacity.3 Since the tribunal was 
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1 For a recent example, see Messiha (by his tutor Magdy Messiha) v South East Health [2004] NSWSC 1061. 
2 It also has jurisdiction in relation to a wide range of personal (including health) and financial matters for adults with impaired 
capacity: Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 82. Note also that the Supreme Court’s inherent jurisdiction, 
including its parens patriae jurisdiction, is specifically preserved: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld), s 109, and Guardianship 
and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 240.  
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established in 2000, it has considered issues concerning withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining 
treatment on four occasions.4 
 These kinds of matters are likely to be brought before the tribunal where there is disagreement 
about the proposed treatment, either between the adult’s medical team and the family,5 or between the 
adult’s family.6 If the decision to withhold or withdraw treatment is being made by the adult herself or 
himself, depending on the circumstances, there may also be some concern regarding the adult’s 
capacity to make the decision.7 Finally, even if the family and medical team agree that treatment 
should be withheld or withdrawn, a health provider may be reluctant to take such action because of 
concerns about possible legal ramifications.8 
 This article considers how the tribunal makes these decisions in Queensland, starting with an 
examination of the relevant (and complex) legislative regime: the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) 
and the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld).9 It then identifies anomalies in some of 
these provisions that may make the tribunal’s task more difficult and, finally, it suggests how the 
tribunal might be able to chart a course through these difficult legislative waters. 
 To assist in examining this legislation, a recent decision of the tribunal, Re MC [2003] QGAAT 
13, is also considered. In this case, on the application of her sons, the tribunal consented to the 
withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration from an 80-year-old woman, Mrs C, who was in a 
permanent vegetative state.10  
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS: AN OVERVIEW 
The Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) 
regulate how decisions about “financial matters” and “personal matters” are made on behalf of 
someone with impaired capacity (referred to in this article as the “adult”).11 A “personal matter” 
includes the provision of “health care”.12 “Health care” is defined to include: 
withholding or withdrawal of a life-sustaining measure for the adult if the commencement or 
continuation of the measure for the adult would be inconsistent with good medical practice.13 
A “life-sustaining measure” is also defined in the legislation: 
(1) A “life-sustaining measure” is health care intended to sustain or prolong life and that supplants or 
maintains the operation of vital bodily functions that are temporarily or permanently incapable of 
independent operation. 
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), each of the following is a “life-sustaining measure” – 
(a) cardiopulmonary resuscitation; 
(b) assisted ventilation; 
(c) artificial nutrition and hydration. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
3 This article will only consider decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures from adults (that is, persons who 
are aged 18 or over: Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 36) because the tribunal’s jurisdiction over such decisions does not 
extend to children. 
4 Re MC [2003] QGAAT 13; Re TM [2002] QGAAT 1; Re PVM [2000] QGAAT 1; Re RWG [2000] QGAAT 2. 
5 Although a decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court rather than the tribunal, such a disagreement was the basis of an 
application by the adult’s sister in Northridge v Central Sydney Area Health Service (2000) 50 NSWLR 549. 
6 See eg Re TM [2002] QGAAT 1. 
7 See eg Re PVM [2000] QGAAT 1. 
8 In Re MC [2003] QGAAT 13 the application was brought by Mrs C’s sons because the treating doctor was reluctant to 
withdraw or withhold treatment without the express consent of the tribunal. 
9 This legislation also governs other people (such as statutory health attorneys or guardians) who are authorised to make 
decisions on behalf of an adult. 
10 The artificial nutrition and hydration was provided to Mrs C through a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG), which is 
a tube that goes directly into the stomach. 
11 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), Sch 2, ss 1-2. 
12 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), Sch 2, s 2(g). 
13 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), Sch 2, s 5(2). This definition raises a number of difficulties that are 
addressed later in the article. The Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) contains a virtually identical definition (except the word 
“adult” is replaced by “principal”): Sch 2, s 5(2).  
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(3) A blood transfusion is not a “life-sustaining measure”.14 
 A decision to withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining measure, therefore, may constitute a 
decision about health care. The legislation then establishes a decision-making regime in cases where 
the decision is one relating to health care. Putting aside the situation where an advance health 
directive has been executed,15 the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) sets out a list of 
potential decision-makers and the first person or entity in this list that applies to the particular 
situation will be the decision-maker:16 
• a guardian appointed by the tribunal for the health matter or an order made by the tribunal about 
the matter; 
• an attorney who has been appointed by the adult to make a decision about the matter under either 
an advance health directive or an enduring power of attorney; 
• a statutory health attorney. 
 The legislation also defines who is a “statutory health attorney”. The Powers of Attorney Act 
1998 (Qld) sets out a priority list, with the statutory health attorney being the first person in the list 
who is “readily available and culturally appropriate” to make the decision.17 The order of priority is as 
follows: 
• a spouse of the adult if the relationship between the adult and spouse is close and continuing;18 
• a person who is 18 years or more and who has the care of the adult and is not a paid carer for the 
adult;19 
• a person who is 18 years or more and who is a close friend or relation of the adult and is not a 
paid carer for the adult; 
• the adult guardian.20 
 As well as establishing the appropriate person to provide consent for a health matter, the 
legislation also guides the decision-maker as to how he or she should reach a decision on behalf of the 
adult. Schedule 1 of both Acts sets out a number of principles that must inform these sorts of 
decisions. They are separated into “General Principles” and the “Health Care Principle”. The general 
principles apply to all decisions made under the legislation, of which withholding and withdrawing 
life-sustaining medical treatment is just one, and so are necessarily broad. The health care principle is 
used for health-related decisions only. 
 A final matter to note is the additional protection provided by the legislation regarding decisions 
to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures. Because of the gravity of the decision, a consent to 
withholding or withdrawal of a life-sustaining measure cannot operate unless the adult’s health 
provider “reasonably considers the commencement or continuation of the measure for the adult would 
be inconsistent with good medical practice”.21 
 
14 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld), Sch 2, s 5A; Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), Sch 2, s 5A. This 
definition specifically includes the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration to a person in a persistent vegetative state, 
although it is not clear whether it would extend to the hand-feeding of a patient who is in the same condition but has not lost 
the swallowing reflex.  
15 The first way in which a matter may be decided is by an advance health directive executed by the adult. This takes priority 
over the three potential decision-makers set out below. However, it is omitted from this list because different considerations 
apply when a matter is determined by an advance health directive and they are not considered further in this article. 
16 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 66.  
17 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld), s 63. 
18 “Spouse” will include de facto partners (both heterosexual and same-sex partners): Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld),  
s 32DA. 
19 The definition of “paid carer” excludes those who receive a State or Commonwealth carer payment or other similar benefit, 
or who are funded from compensation awarded due to the adult with impaired capacity being injured through negligence: 
Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld), Sch 3; Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), Sch 4. 
20 The “adult guardian” is a position that was established by the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and that person is charged 
with the responsibility of protecting the rights and interests of adults with impaired capacity: Guardianship and Administration 
Act 2000 (Qld), s 174. 
21 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 66A(2). 
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ROLE OF THE TRIBUNAL 
As has already been discussed, it is rare for the tribunal to be involved in a decision to withhold or 
withdraw life-sustaining measures from an adult. Most decisions of this kind are made by someone 
who is close to the adult in accordance with the regime described in the previous section. The 
decision-maker may be a guardian appointed by the tribunal, an attorney appointed under an advance 
health directive or enduring power of attorney or may be a statutory health attorney. The tribunal is 
likely to be involved only if there is some disagreement about the proposed treatment, or if the doctor 
(even if agreeing with the decision to withhold or withdraw treatment) is not prepared to take such 
action without tribunal endorsement. 
 The role of the tribunal in any particular matter will depend upon why the application was 
brought. The applicant may be requesting that the tribunal itself consent to the withholding or 
withdrawal of life-sustaining measures. Alternatively (or in addition), the applicant may be seeking 
some kind of declaratory relief.  
Tribunal consent 
If there is more than one attorney or guardian for a matter and they cannot agree on a course of 
treatment, one or more of them may attempt to resolve the impasse by seeking tribunal consent to 
withhold or withdraw the life-sustaining measure. The advantage of this course of action is that the 
decision is made by a statutory body after hearing all material facts and, as such, the decision is more 
likely to be accepted by the attorneys or guardians, family and friends. To date, the tribunal has 
consented to the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining measures in only three cases.22 
Declaratory and other relief 
Another potential avenue for relief is to apply to the tribunal for a “declaration, order, direction, 
recommendation or advice in relation to an adult”.23 This may provide assistance in a variety of cases 
where some uncertainty surrounds the decision to withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining measure. For 
example, declaratory relief may be of assistance in the following situations: 
• a dispute arises between family members about who the appropriate decision-maker is in relation 
to a decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures; 
• there is more than one decision-maker and each decision-maker arrives at a different decision 
when applying the General Principles and the Health Care Principle;24 
• the decision-maker has consented to the withholding or withdrawal of a life-sustaining measure, 
but the treating health provider is not satisfied that the requirement of the legislation – that 
commencement or continuation of the measure would be inconsistent with good medical practice 
– has been satisfied.25 
 Re MC [2003] QGAAT 13 is illustrative of this last point. In that case, the application for 
tribunal consent was made by Mrs C’s sons because the health provider was reluctant to withhold or 
withdraw artificial hydration and nutrition without such consent (at [9]).26 As mentioned, a consent to 
the withholding or withdrawal of a life-sustaining measure cannot operate “unless the adult’s health 
provider reasonably considers the commencement or continuation of the measure for the adult would 
be inconsistent with good medical practice”.27 A declaration by the tribunal that, in the circumstances 
 
22 Re MC [2003] QGAAT 13; Re TM [2002] QGAAT 1; and Re RWG [2000] QGAAT 2. 
23 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 115. 
24 This could occur if two relatives are statutory health attorneys under s 63(1) of the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld), or the 
adult has appointed two attorneys under an advance health directive or enduring power of attorney. 
25 The health provider may not act upon a consent unless he or she is satisfied of this requirement: Guardianship and 
Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 66A. 
26 In that case, one of Mrs C’s sons had been appointed her attorney for health matters so he was authorised to consent to the 
withdrawal, but the health provider was not prepared to act on that consent. 
27 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 66A(2). 
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of that case, continuing treatment would be inconsistent with good medical practice would have 
provided appropriate relief.28 
TRIBUNAL CONSENT: THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
If the application is for the tribunal, as a potential decision-maker under the legislation,29 to give its 
consent to withholding or withdrawing a life-sustaining measure, there is a range of issues that must 
be considered before providing that consent. These issues, which will be examined in turn, may also 
be relevant to a tribunal providing declaratory relief, if the declaration sought requires a determination 
of some or all of these issues.  
Adult lacks capacity 
A decision about a health matter can only be made on behalf of an adult if the adult no longer has 
capacity to make that decision for herself or himself. The starting point is a presumption that an adult 
has capacity to decide a matter.30 “Capacity” is defined in the legislation in the following terms: 
“Capacity”, for a person for a matter, means the person is capable of – 
(a) understanding the nature and effect of decisions about the matter; and 
(b) freely and voluntarily making decisions about the matter; and 
(c) communicating the decisions in some way.31 
A crucial issue for the tribunal in every case is whether the presumption of capacity has been rebutted. 
When considering General Principle 1, which provides that an adult is presumed to have capacity for 
a matter, Ambrose J in Re Bridges [2001] 1 Qd R 574 at 583 commented in the following terms: 
That does not mean it is an irrebuttable presumption that she has capacity. In my view, on a proper 
construction of the Act, that presumption is rebuttable.32 
It is frequently the case that the issue of the adult’s (lack of) capacity is not in dispute. In Re MC 
[2003] QGAAT 13, for example, Mrs C was in a permanent vegetative state and her condition would 
not improve (at [37]), so it was clear that she lacked capacity to make decisions about her health care.  
 By contrast, the issue of capacity was squarely before the tribunal in Re PVM [2000] QGAAT 1. 
In that case, Mr M’s wife applied to the tribunal seeking, amongst other things, the tribunal’s consent 
to remove Mr M’s ventilation. Mr M had sustained traumatic brain injury and spinal chord injury 
after a severe fall. As a result of his injuries, he had difficulty communicating. His wife claimed that, 
on a previous occasion, her husband had given her clear instructions that he did not wish to be put on 
a ventilator, and that he still did not want this course of action.33 However, there was conflicting 
evidence before the tribunal as to whether or not Mr M had capacity to make a decision about 
withholding his ventilation. 
 The intensive care specialists (one of whom was the director of the unit in which Mr M was 
being treated) were of the view that Mr M had capacity to decide about treatment, while the 
 
28 The actual order of the tribunal was to consent to the withholding of a life-sustaining measure to Mrs C, as sought by the 
application of her sons. In its reasons, the tribunal noted the existence of various guidelines which suggested that discontinuing 
treatment in Mrs C’s case would be consistent with good medical practice. 
29 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 66A. 
30 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 7(a). General Principle 1 (Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and 
Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), Sch 1) has also been cited as authority for this point (eg, Re Bridges [2001]  
1 Qd R 574) although reliance on this section may be problematic because the General Principles only apply to decisions where 
there is “an adult with impaired capacity” for a matter: Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 11. The difficulty 
that this raises is that this presumption of capacity in the General Principles could only operate once the adult has been found to 
have impaired capacity for the relevant decision. Section 7(a) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) avoids 
this problem, however, as the presumption of capacity in that provision is not connected with an assessment of impaired 
capacity. 
31 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld), Sch 3; Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), Sch 4. 
32 Cited in Re PVM [2000] QGAAT 1 at [37]. 
33 As the applicant was of the view that the adult, Mr M, had capacity to consent to the withdrawal of ventilation, perhaps the 
more appropriate relief to seek would have been a declaration about the adult’s capacity, rather than an application for the 
tribunal’s consent to withdraw the ventilation. 
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psychiatrists who assessed Mr M concluded that he lacked capacity. The tribunal was more persuaded 
by the evidence of the intensive care specialists because they were experienced in dealing with 
patients who had difficulties in communication. On the other hand, the psychiatrists had more limited 
contact with Mr M and were not specialised in communicating with people in Mr M’s condition. It 
was also relevant to the tribunal that the intensive care specialists were more certain of their diagnosis 
of capacity than were the psychiatrists. 
 Differing views concerning Mr M’s capacity were also held by his family. Mr M’s mother, wife 
and two of his sisters felt that he had capacity, while some other family members did not. The tribunal 
was more persuaded by the evidence of those closest to Mr M, namely his mother and wife, both of 
whom were confident of Mr M’s capacity to make the decision. In finding that Mr M was capable of 
making a decision about whether his ventilation should continue or not, the tribunal held that the 
presumption of capacity had not been rebutted.  
 The definition of “capacity” in the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and Guardianship and 
Administration Act 2000 (Qld) is consistent with how this issue has been treated at common law so it 
may be appropriate, in some circumstances, for the tribunal to obtain guidance from some of the 
common law cases. A first similarity is that, as is the case under the legislation, at common law a 
person is presumed to have capacity to make a decision about a matter.34  
 Second, the capacity that is required at common law varies with the nature of the decision to be 
made. The graver the consequences of the decision, the higher the adult’s capacity must be.35 This is 
illustrated well by the case of Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449. 
B was a 41-year-old woman who was a tetraplegic and suffered complete paralysis from the neck 
down. She wanted to be taken off life-sustaining measures but the hospital would not agree. B was 
forced to apply for declaratory relief that the hospital’s actions constituted an assault because they 
were treating her without consent. Before it could grant the relief sought, the Family Division had to 
assess whether B had capacity to make this decision and concluded that she did. However, as her 
decision to withdraw treatment had grave consequences, the capacity needed to make this decision 
was correspondingly high. 
 This same approach is likely to be taken under the legislation. Paragraph (a) of the definition of 
“capacity” requires that a person be capable of understanding the nature and effect of decisions about 
the matter. Where the consequence of the decision is particularly serious, the tribunal is likely to 
require convincing evidence that the adult understands the nature and effect of the decision. In Re 
PVM [2000] QGAAT 1, for example, the tribunal received evidence from many health providers and 
family members about the adult’s capacity. This evidence was assessed very carefully before the 
tribunal was prepared to find that the adult had sufficient capacity to make the decision.  
 A third similarity is that a person is only regarded as having capacity at common law if he or she 
is able to make a decision about a health matter freely and voluntarily. This is not satisfied if the will 
of the adult is overborne. In Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1992] 3 WLR 782, for example, T 
was a young woman who had been in an accident. Her condition deteriorated and she needed a blood 
transfusion. After a meeting with her mother, a Jehovah’s Witness, T declined any treatment that 
involved blood products. The English Court of Appeal held that T’s decision was not her own, but 
one reached because her will was overborne by that of her mother. In effect, the court held that the 
undue influence of her mother meant that T lacked capacity to decide to refuse blood products. This 
common law approach is reflected in para (b) of the definition of “capacity” in Queensland’s 
legislation.  
 A fourth similarity with the common law is that the legislative definition of capacity for a matter 
is contingent upon the ability to communicate the decision. At common law, a similar view prevails 
although a distinction has been made between capacity and competence. In the recent decision of  
R (on application of Burke) v General Medical Council [2004] EWHC 1879 (Admin), Munby J 
explained that a patient may have mental capacity to make a decision but may still be regarded as 
incompetent because the patient lacks the ability to communicate her or his views (at [41]-[45]). 
Accordingly, at common law a “patient suffering the mental torture of Guillain-Barré syndrome, 
 
34 Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449 at 457. 
35 Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449 at 472. 
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rational but trapped and mute in an unresponsive body” (at [45]), would be considered incompetent to 
make a decision about their health care. Under the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and the 
Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), such a person would be regarded as having 
impaired capacity for a matter. Although different terms are used, the result is, of course, the same, 
with a person who is unable to communicate a decision being incapable of making it. 
Whether the matter constitutes “health care” 
The tribunal has been given the power to consent to the withholding or withdrawal of a life-sustaining 
measure for adults with impaired capacity.36 The scope of this power is constrained, however, by a 
series of rather awkward definitions in the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and the Guardianship 
and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), which require the tribunal to consider certain issues. 
 The part of the definition of “life-sustaining measures” that is relevant here is that it must be 
“health care”.37 However, the meaning of that term presents difficulties because its definition states 
that withholding or withdrawing a life-sustaining measure constitutes health care under the legislation 
“if the commencement or continuation of the measure for the adult would be inconsistent with good 
medical practice”.38 The logical corollary of this is that withholding or withdrawing a life-sustaining 
measure where the commencement or continuation is consistent with good medical practice would 
not constitute “health care” under the legislation. The outcome of this is that, if treatment is not health 
care, it cannot be a “life-sustaining measure” for which the tribunal is empowered to consent to 
withhold or withdraw.39 
 Accordingly, for the tribunal to consent to withholding or withdrawing the life-sustaining 
measure, it would have to satisfy itself that such a decision was about health care, which, because of 
the definition discussed, means that it must conclude that continuing or commencing the measure for 
the adult would be inconsistent with good medical practice. Therefore, the tribunal would need to 
hear medical evidence about what constitutes good medical practice in the circumstances of the case 
before it. 
 In Re MC [2003] QGAAT 13 the tribunal received both verbal and written evidence about what 
constituted appropriate treatment for Mrs C. This included evidence from medical practitioners as 
well as empirical research and academic literature about appropriate medical treatment for patients in 
a permanent vegetative state. The tribunal also considered the guidelines in New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom that assist health providers in making decisions about treatment.40 Although the 
tribunal was of the view that it did not need to determine whether continuing artificial hydration and 
nutrition was inconsistent with good medical practice (at [51]), it spent some time considering this 
issue and concluded that, on the facts of the case, it was in accordance with good medical practice to 
discontinue treatment that was burdensome and futile (at [65]). 
 If the tribunal is asked to consent to the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining measures, it 
must satisfy itself that such a decision is one about “health care”. As the definition of “health care” is 
currently drafted, this would require the tribunal to determine whether commencing or continuing the 
treatment is inconsistent with good medical practice. Only if this is answered in the affirmative will a 
decision to withhold or withdraw constitute “health care”, and the tribunal then is able to consider 
whether it should consent to its withholding or withdrawal. 
Consideration of General Principles and Health Care Principle 
In deciding whether to consent to withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining measure, the tribunal must 
consider both the General Principles and Health Care Principle that are set out in Sch 1.41 
 
36 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 82(1)(f). 
37 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), Sch 2, s 5A. 
38 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), Sch 2, s 5(2). 
39 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 82(1)(f). 
40 At the conclusion of its reasons for decision, the tribunal observed that it would be of assistance to those who had to make 
decisions about withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining measures for the Australian Medical Association to produce a 
comprehensive set of guidelines to assist the decision-making process: Re MC [2003] QGAAT 13 at [71]. 
41 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 11(1). 
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General Principles 
A number of the 11 General Principles (GP) may be relevant to a decision to withhold or withdraw 
life-sustaining measures, depending on the facts of the particular case. The following principles, in 
particular, may be relevant to this kind of health decision: 
• GP2(1): “The right of all adults to the same basic human rights regardless of a particular adult’s 
capacity must be recognised and taken into account.” 
It is beyond question that a competent adult is entitled to decide to withhold or withdraw 
life-sustaining measures42 and it could be argued that GP2(1) supports the view that an adult 
who lacks capacity should be entitled to the same choices. 
• GP3: “An adult’s right to respect for his or her human worth and dignity as an individual must be 
recognised and taken into account.” 
• GP7(4): “Also, the principle of substituted judgment must be used so that if, from the adult’s 
previous actions, it is reasonably practicable to work out what the adult’s views and wishes 
would be, a person … must take into account what the person … considers would be the adult’s 
views and wishes.”43 
• GP9: “The importance of maintaining an adult’s cultural and linguistic environment, and set of 
values (including any religious beliefs), must be taken into account.”  
This principle may be relevant if, for example, the adult has particular religious beliefs 
which prohibit certain treatment being given. 
• GP10: “Power for a matter should be exercised by a guardian or administrator for an adult in a 
way that is appropriate to the adult’s characteristics and needs.” 
It is foreseeable that this principle could be relevant in a decision about life-sustaining 
measures. Indeed, if the decision is to be made by a guardian appointed by the tribunal for 
the purpose, the guardian must take these factors into consideration. However, the wording 
of the provision would suggest that it will only apply if the consent is given by a guardian 
rather than the tribunal.44 Although the tribunal is not directed to consider the adult’s 
characteristics and needs under GP10, it is submitted that these kinds of issues will 
nevertheless be relevant in an assessment of substituted judgment (GP7(4)) and what is 
“necessary and appropriate” to maintain or promote the adult’s health or wellbeing 
(HCP12(1)(b)(i)). 
 Some of these principles were considered by the tribunal in Re MC [2003] QGAAT 13. It placed 
particular weight (at [67]-[68]) on considerations of Mrs C’s human worth and dignity in the context 
of being provided with futile treatment (GP3) and the principle of substituted judgment (GP7(4)). 
Health Care Principle  
The legislation also requires the Health Care Principle (HCP) to be considered in any decision about a 
health matter.45 It will therefore be considered by the tribunal in determining whether to consent to 
withdraw or withhold a life-sustaining measure. The HCP is as follows:46 
12 Health Care Principle 
(1) The “health care principle” means that power for a health matter for an adult should be exercised by 
an attorney – 
(a) in the way least restrictive of the adult’s rights; and 
(b) only if the exercise of power – 
 
42 Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449 at 472. 
43 Note, however, that a person must exercise a power under the legislation in a way consistent with the adult’s proper care and 
protection: GP7(5). 
44 See also the equivalent wording in GP10 in Sch 1 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) where reference is made only to 
“attorney”, not to the tribunal. 
45 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 11. 
46 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), Sch 1, Pt 2. The Health Care 
Principle in Sch 1 of the Guardianship and Administration Act includes a further provision that relates to special health care. 
This has not been reproduced as is not relevant for the purposes of this article. 
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(i) is necessary and appropriate to maintain or promote the adult’s health or wellbeing; 
or 
(ii) is, in all the circumstances, in the adult’s best interests. 
Example of exercising power in the way least restrictive of the adult’s rights – 
If there is a choice between a more or less intrusive way of meeting an identified need, the less 
intrusive way should be adopted. 
(2) In deciding whether the exercise of a power is appropriate, the … Tribunal… must, to the extent 
practicable – 
(a) seek the adult’s views and wishes and take them into account; and 
(b) take the information given by the adult’s health provider into account. 
(3) The adult’s views and wishes may be expressed – 
(a) orally; or 
(b) in writing, for example, in an advance health directive; or 
(c) in another way, including, for example, by conduct. 
(4) The health care principle does not affect any right an adult has to refuse health care. 
 A number of comments can be made about HCP12. First, the power to make a decision must be 
exercised in the way least restrictive of the adult’s rights. This principle was applied by the tribunal in 
Re MC [2003] QGAAT 13 in the context of the provision of artificial hydration and nutrition through 
a PEG.47 The tribunal held (at [64]) that treatment of this kind was not the least restrictive option, 
because it was intrusive, futile and burdensome.48 This was the conclusion even though the only 
alternative treatment option, the cessation of the PEG feeding, would result in Mrs C’s death.49 
 Second, the tribunal must exercise the power only if it is satisfied that one of the conditions in 
HCP(1)(b) is met. The exercise of the power must either be necessary and appropriate to maintain or 
promote the adult’s health or wellbeing or, in all the circumstances, in the adult’s best interests.50 
 Third, the drafting of HCP12 raises an interesting point concerning the extent to which the 
tribunal is required to consider the adult’s views and wishes and the information provided by the 
health provider as referred to in HCP12(2). This provision requires the tribunal to consider these 
factors in “deciding whether the exercise of a power is appropriate”. The term “appropriate” is used 
in HCP12(1)(b)(i) but not in HCP12(1)(b)(ii) which refers to the adult’s “best interests”. This raises 
the question of whether the matters referred to in HCP12(2) are relevant only where the tribunal 
exercises its power under HCP12(1)(b)(i) (necessary and appropriate), or are also relevant when it 
exercises its power under HCP12(1)(b)(ii) (in the adult’s best interests). 
 There is a strong case to suggest that the factors in HCP12(2) are relevant only where the 
exercise of the power is “necessary and appropriate” in HCP12(1)(b)(i). From a statutory 
interpretation perspective, if a section uses a word twice in the one provision, it is presumed to have 
the same meaning at both places.51 The effect of this presumption would be that the use of the word 
“appropriate” in HCP12(2) is a reference to the same word in HCP12(1)(b)(i). This would mean that 
the factors listed under HCP12(2) are not specifically required to be considered when deciding upon 
the exercise of power in an adult’s bests interests under HCP12(1)(b)(ii). This interpretation is given 
additional weight when the original drafting of HCP12 is considered. Originally, HCP12(1)(b) 
referred only to the exercise of power that was “necessary and appropriate”, the term “appropriate” 
being defined in HCP12(2). The provision referring to an “adult’s best interests” was inserted later,52 
 
47 See above n 10. 
48 The tribunal also cited the decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court in Northridge v Central Sydney Area Health 
Service (2000) 50 NSWLR 549 to support this view. 
49 See also Re TM [2002] QGAAT 1 at [164]-[165]. 
50 Compare Re MC [2003] QGAAT 13 at [55] where the tribunal considered the best interests test to be a test that had to be 
satisfied in deciding on a health matter.   
51 See eg Wilson v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1986) 6 NSWLR 410 at 418-419.  
52 By the Guardianship and Administration and Other Acts Amendment Act 2001 (Qld), s 16. 
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which suggests that the reference to “appropriate” in HCP12(2) was not designed to apply to 
HCP12(1)(b)(ii). 
 It is conceded, however, that despite these interpretation difficulties, the current drafting of 
HCP12 may not cause many difficulties in practice. This is because it may already be the case, as the 
law is currently drafted, that both an adult’s views and wishes and information from the adult’s health 
provider should be considered when assessing best interests under HCP12(1)(b)(ii). At common law, 
the determination of best interests is strongly driven by the views of the treating doctor and also 
includes considering what an adult wants (or would have wanted).53 Further, an adult’s views and 
wishes must be considered under GP7(4), already discussed.  
 A related fourth comment is that the reference to “best interests”, which is not defined in the 
legislation, is likely to import the meaning developed by a body of cases at common law.54 Indeed, in 
Re MC [2003] QGAAT 13, after noting the best interests test under the legislation, the tribunal then 
referred to relevant common law cases (at [56]-[62]). It is beyond the scope of this article to consider 
the meaning of “best interests” at common law, but it has developed beyond factors such as medical 
issues regarding prognosis and treatment to include other factors such as the views and wishes of the 
adult and possible the adult’s relatives.55 
A conflict of Principles 
Finally, the difficulties that may be encountered by the tribunal if some of the Principles suggest one 
course of action while others suggest a different approach. For example, there may be clear and 
undisputed evidence that an adult would not have wanted to be kept alive by artificial means but, in 
the circumstances of the case, continued treatment was regarded as being in the adult’s best interests. 
A conflict of principles can arise because GP7(4) requires the tribunal to consider the principle of 
substituted judgment while HCP12(1)(b)(ii) refers to the adult’s best interests. The legislation does 
not provide guidance as to which of the Principles should have priority in determining the appropriate 
decision. This may raise difficulties because it means that the tribunal must make a value judgment 
about which Principle to give priority to in a particular situation. 
Relevance of good medical practice 
If an adult has impaired capacity, as discussed above, the tribunal (or another person or entity) may 
give consent for withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining measures from that adult. Under s 66A of 
the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), however, that consent is subject to the 
constraint that it cannot “operate unless the adult’s health provider reasonably considers the 
commencement or continuation of the measure for the adult would be inconsistent with good medical 
practice”.56 This safeguard was designed to prevent inappropriate decisions by empowering the 
treating health care professional to prevent that consent from taking effect unless the decision is also 
medically appropriate. 
 If an application is made to the tribunal to obtain its consent to the withholding or withdrawal of 
a life-sustaining measure, technically the tribunal would not have to make a determination about good 
medical practice pursuant to s 66A(2). This is a matter for determination by the health provider, not 
by the person or entity providing consent. Indeed, this was the view taken by the tribunal in Re MC 
[2003] QGAAT 13 at [51]-[52]. 
 However, it is submitted that there are two reasons that it may be desirable (or possibly 
necessary) for a tribunal to make a determination about whether commencing or continuing the life-
sustaining measure would be inconsistent with good medical practice. The first reason is a practical 
rather than a legal one. If the application to the tribunal is because the health provider is reluctant to 
withhold or withdraw the measure without tribunal consent, then the provision of that consent of itself 
may not solve the difficulty encountered by the health provider. This is because, notwithstanding 
 
53 See eg Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789; Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 235; 
Re G [1997] 2 NZLR 201. 
54 Ibid. 
55 See eg the often-quoted statement by Butler-Sloss P in Re A (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549 at 555: “best interests 
encompasses medical, emotional and all other welfare issues.” 
56 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 66A(2). 
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tribunal consent, the health provider must still be satisfied in relation to good medical practice under  
s 66A(2). The health provider’s concerns will only be addressed if the tribunal makes a declaration in 
relation to good medical practice.57  
 The second reason why the tribunal may need to consider good medical practice is the definition 
of “health care” in the context of withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining measures. As discussed, 
such a decision only constitutes health care if the commencement or continuation of the measure 
would be inconsistent with good medical practice. Before the tribunal can consent, it must satisfy 
itself that the proposed treatment is health care which requires a finding to be made in relation to 
good medical practice. 
Potential criminal responsibility  
Withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining measures can potentially have criminal law implications. 
A doctor or other health provider who fails to provide medical treatment needed to stay alive may 
breach s 285 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), which imposes a duty on certain individuals to 
provide the “necessaries of life”. A failure to provide such necessaries will result in the health 
provider being deemed to have caused the consequences of that failure.58 In this context, that 
consequence would be the death of the patient, and that killing would be unlawful unless it was 
authorised, justified or excused by law.59  
 The tribunal (and other decision-makers), in consenting to the withholding or withdrawing of 
life-sustaining measures, may encounter difficulties as there is tension between the criminal law as 
discussed and the consent mechanism created by the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and the 
Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld). This tension is made explicit by s 284 of the 
Criminal Code, which provides that consent by a person to their own death does not affect the 
criminal responsibility of any person by whom such death is caused. Interestingly, the Powers of 
Attorney Act and the Guardianship and Administration Act specifically provide that nothing in these 
Acts authorises, justifies or excuses the killing of a person, or affects s 284 of the Criminal Code.60 
 The potential criminal liability that could arise when consenting to withholding or withdrawing 
life-sustaining measures was recognised by the tribunal in Re RWG [2000] QGAAT 2 at [55]: 
This issue of whether life-sustaining treatment can be withheld from a patient with impaired capacity is 
also further complicated by the fact that health care professionals have certain duties under the 
Criminal Code which essentially require that a person having charge of another is required to provide 
that person with the necessaries of life if the person is unable to do so for himself because of sickness 
or unsoundness of mind or age. 
This relationship between the Criminal Code and the Powers of Attorney Act and the Guardianship 
and Administration Act is unsatisfactory. However, it is submitted that there are two possible bases 
upon which it can be argued that withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining measures pursuant to 
consent obtained under the Powers of Attorney Act or the Guardianship and Administration Act will 
not involve criminal responsibility. 
Consent renders withholding or withdrawal lawful 
At common law, a “mentally competent patient has an absolute right to refuse to consent to medical 
treatment for any reason, rational or irrational, or for no reason at all, even where that decision may 
lead to his or her own death”.61 This also represents the law in Queensland.62 The rationale for this is 
that in such cases, the principle of self-determination prevails over the sanctity of human life.63 
 
57 As discussed, the tribunal has power to provide a declaration: Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 115. 
58 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 285. 
59 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 291. 
60 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld), s 37; Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 238. 
61 Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426 at 432 per Butler-Sloss LJ. See also Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical 
Treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449. 
62 Re RWG [2000] QGAAT 2 at [54]-[55]. In this case, the tribunal concluded that this was the common law in Queensland and 
also drew on the provisions of the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld).  
63 Re B (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449; Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 
649. 
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 Although that is clearly the law, the issue of how this fits within the criminal law framework 
remains and this is an issue that some judges have addressed. A good example is Lord Browne-
Wilkinson in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at 882-883: 
A mentally competent patient can at any time put an end to life support systems by refusing his consent 
to their continuation. In the ordinary case of murder by positive act of commission, the consent of the 
victim is no defence. But where the charge is one of murder by omission to do an act and the act 
omitted could only be done with the consent of the patient, refusal by the patient of consent to the 
doing of such act does, indirectly, provide a defence to the charge of murder. The doctor cannot owe to 
the patient any duty to maintain his life where that life can only be sustained by intrusive medical care 
to which the patient will not consent. 
Although Bland is a decision on the common law, a similar argument could be made in Queensland. 
Providing a competent patient with life-sustaining measures even after consent has been withdrawn 
would mean that the health provider will be committing an assault under s 246 of the Criminal Code. 
The argument would follow that although s 284 provides that criminal responsibility is not affected if 
a person consents to her or his own death, that provision cannot have application to the case of a 
competent refusal of life-sustaining measures.64  
 If this argument is correct, then the legal position must be the same for adults with impaired 
capacity, for whom decisions are made on their behalf under the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) 
and the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld). This is because the legislation specifically 
provides that if a health provider carries out health care that is authorised under the legislation, he or 
she is “not liable for an act or omission to any greater extent than if the act or omission happened with 
the adult’s consent and the adult had capacity to consent”.65 Accordingly, if no criminal liability 
attaches to a decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures from a competent patient, 
consent given by the tribunal under the Powers of Attorney Act and the Guardianship and 
Administration Act for an adult with impaired capacity will also absolve health care professionals of 
criminal responsibility. 
Not a necessary of life 
A second line of argument as to why withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining measures does not 
attract criminal responsibility is that it does not breach the duty created by s 285 of the Criminal 
Code.66 That section imposes a duty on a health provider to provide “necessaries of life” to a patient 
under her or his control. However, if the treatment (in this case, a life-sustaining measure) is not a 
necessary of life, the health provider is not under a duty to provide it.  
 Although there has been some suggestion that whether or not treatment will be regarded as a 
“necessary of life” will depend on the nature of the treatment,67 it is suggested that terms such as 
“extraordinary measures” should be avoided. Rather, a preferred approach is to assess whether the 
treatment, in the actual circumstances of the particular case (having regard to the patient’s condition 
and prognosis), can appropriately be called a necessary of life. 
 This was an issue addressed by Thomas J in Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General 
[1993] 1 NZLR 235.68 In considering whether a ventilator was a necessary of life for a man who 
suffered from Guillain-Barré syndrome and who was “beyond recovery”, Thomas J said (at 249-250): 
To my mind, however, there is no absolute answer; the answer in each case must depend on the facts. 
Thus, the provision of artificial respiration may be regarded as a necessary of life where it is required 
 
64 There are problems, however, with such an argument. For example, it could be argued that s 284 is clearly the more specific 
of the two provisions (and appears later in the Act) and so should take precedence in the case of conflict. 
65 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), s 80. Note also s 79 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 
(Qld) which provides (like Criminal Code, s 246) that if a health care professional treats an adult with impaired capacity 
without consent, then he or she has committed an offence. 
66 This section was discussed in Re RWG [2000] QGAAT 2 at [55] (see above). 
67 Some writers have suggested that whether treatment was a necessary of life or not depended on whether it was an “extra-
ordinary measure”: MacFarlane P and Reid S, Queensland Health Law Handbook (14th ed, Goprint, Brisbane 2004). This view 
was also noted by the tribunal in Re RWG [2000] QGAAT 2 at [56]. 
68 The provision considered was s 151 of New Zealand’s Crimes Act 1961 (NZ), which imposes a similar duty to s 285 of the 
Criminal Code (Qld). 
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to prevent, cure or alleviate a disease that endangers the health or life of the patient. If, however, the 
patient is surviving only by virtue of the mechanical means which induces heartbeat and breathing and 
is beyond recovery, I do not consider that the provision of a ventilator can properly be construed as a 
necessary of life. 
Thomas J went on to say, however, that artificial ventilation could be construed as a necessary of life 
in appropriate circumstances (at 250). The example given is where a patient needs this interim 
support so as to enable her or him to recover from an illness, in which case such treatment would be a 
necessary of life. Accordingly, the question of whether or not treatment is a necessary of life is best 
answered not by reference to the treatment itself but to the circumstances in which it is applied. It is 
suggested that in a case like Re MC,69 it would be open to the tribunal to declare that the artificial 
hydration and nutrition being provided to Mrs C, who was also “beyond recovery”, was not a 
necessary of life and therefore there was no duty to provide it.  
 As discussed, liability arises under s 285 because, by breaching the duty to provide necessaries of 
life, the health care professional is deemed to have caused the consequences of that breach. However, 
the effect of a declaration by the tribunal that the treatment is not a necessary of life would be that the 
duty has not been breached. Accordingly, the health provider has not caused the death and would not 
be criminally responsible. 
 Although these two alternative bases are available, it is clear that the relationship between the 
Criminal Code and the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and the Guardianship and Administration 
Act 2000 (Qld) is an awkward one. However, it is suggested that the tribunal should be able to 
navigate these difficulties through one or possibly both of the avenues described above. 
CONCLUSION 
When a matter concerning the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining measures comes before 
the tribunal, the relief granted (if any is granted) will depend on the particular reason why the matter 
came before the tribunal. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the tribunal may consent to the 
proposed withholding or withdrawal; or alternatively, may give declaratory relief about who is the 
appropriate decision-maker, whether particular treatment could be regarded as being inconsistent with 
good medical practice, or whether an adult has capacity to make a decision about a matter. 
 If the tribunal is being asked to consent to withholding or withdrawing a life-sustaining measure, 
it needs to consider a number of issues: 
1. The tribunal must assess whether the adult herself or himself has capacity to consent to the 
withholding or withdrawal. Tribunal consent can only be given on an adult’s behalf if incapacity 
has been established.  
2. Consent can only be given by the tribunal if the withholding or withdrawal constitutes “health 
care” as defined in the legislation. It will only be health care if continuing or commencing the 
life-sustaining measure would be inconsistent with good medical practice. If this is not satisfied, 
the proposed treatment will not be health care and the tribunal will be unable to provide consent.  
3. In exercising its discretion, the tribunal will need to consider the General Principles and the 
Health Care Principle listed in Sch 1. Of particular importance will be a consideration of the 
adult’s dignity, what the adult’s likely views and wishes would be, relevant medical information 
about the adult’s condition and prognosis, what is least restrictive of the adult’s rights and, 
possibly, what would be in the adult’s best interests. Because the legislation does not provide 
guidance as to which of these Principles is more important, in some cases the tribunal may be 
required to make an assessment of which of them should be given particular emphasis.  
4. Depending on the reason for seeking consent of the tribunal, it may be prudent to grant 
declaratory relief regarding whether commencing or continuing the measure would be 
inconsistent with good medical practice. A health provider is unable to act on tribunal consent 
unless satisfied that this is the case. Where the medical evidence is equivocal, the tribunal might 
be minded to provide declaratory relief in relation to good medical practice, in addition to 
providing consent to withhold or withdraw the measure. Indeed, as the tribunal is required to 
 
69 As noted above, there was some discussion of this issue in Re RWG [2000] QGAAT 2 at [55]-[57]. 
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make a determination of this issue in assessing whether the withholding or withdrawal constitutes 
“health care”, the tribunal would not have to undertake any further inquiry to provide such 
declaratory relief.  
5. Finally, the tribunal may wish to comment on the implications of its decision (if consent is 
granted) in relation to potential criminal responsibility under the Criminal Code. Although the 
issue is not beyond doubt, the authors are of the view that tribunal consent alone is sufficient to 
ensure criminal responsibility does not attach to a health provider who withholds or withdraws a 
life-sustaining measure where the adult subsequently dies. To put the matter beyond doubt, the 
tribunal may be able to comment on whether, in the circumstances of the case, the measure could 
be regarded as a necessary of life under s 285 of the Criminal Code. 
 The tribunal has, to date, heard only four cases involving withholding or withdrawing life-
sustaining measures and it is suggested that the decisions reached in all of those cases were sensible 
ones. However, it is clear from the foregoing discussion that the task of the tribunal in hearing these 
matters is a difficult one. In addition to the challenging ethical and medical issues raised by such 
decisions, there are also a number of legal problems. The Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and the 
Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) are complex pieces of legislation and their 
operation sometimes produces results that are perhaps unforseen and unintended.70 This article 
addresses some of those difficulties in the legislation and suggests how the tribunal might wish to 
proceed when dealing with those statutory problems. 
 
70 It is beyond the scope of this article to comment on these difficulties. However, for a detailed 
examination of some of the problems in the legislative regime as it relates to decisions to withdraw or 
withhold life-sustaining measures, see the following research issues paper: White B and Willmott L, 
Rethinking Life-sustaining Measures: Questions for Queensland, available at 
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/archive/00007093/01/7093_1.pdf  
